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IF MAJOR WARS AFFECT (JUDICIAL) FISCAL POLICY, HOW & WHY? 
 
by 





This paper seeks to identify and explain the effects of major wars on U.S. 
Supreme Court decision-making in the context of taxation.  At first cut, one might ask 
why we should even expect to observe a correlation between military activities and 
judicial fiscal policy.  After all, the justices have no authority whatsoever to adopt 
funding laws intended to relieve the budgetary pressures that tend to emerge in times 
international crisis.  The Court, however, is able to contribute to the wartime revenue-
raising efforts indirectly by adopting a pro-government stance in the cases it decides in 
wartime periods.  As the probability of a government win increases, the expected revenue 
to the federal fisc also increases.   
 
Relying on Supreme Court tax decisions issued between the years 1909 and 2000, 
this paper identifies a strong and positive correlation between major wartime activity and 
the probability that the government will prevail.  This pro-government bias appears to 
operate through the judicial belief that Congress and the President are better suited to 
address national emergencies.  This perceived imbalance of expertise, however, does not 
lead the Court to adopt a strategy of total deference, but rather a restricted form that 
involves accommodation only on issues that Congress and the President have signaled are 
important to the on-going war activities.  These findings are robust and rule out the 
possibility that the Court is motivated by short-term irrational exuberance for federal 
policymakers associated with the so-called “rally-effect” that emerges when Americans 
feel threatened by forces abroad.  
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Wars, by any measure, are costly endeavors.  Some of these costs are 
incommensurable and difficult to estimate fully, such as those linked to casualties, human 
suffering, and death.  But many others, including direct expenditures on equipment, 
training, and deployment, can be calculated with some precision.  Current data, for 
example, indicate that the U.S. government has engaged in seven major wars1 over the 
course of the 20th and 21st centuries at a cost of nearly $5 trillion dollars.2  As depicted in 
Figure 1 below, the greatest wartime spike in military expenditures occurred in WWII 
when government outlays equaled nearly 40% of GDP.  WWI and the Korean war were 
costly but less so than WWII, and the post-1960 wars, the Vietnam, Gulf, Afghanistan, 






                                                
* Class of 1940 Professor of Law, Northwestern University Law School and Ph.D. student at the University 
of Chicago’s Harris School of Public Policy.  I owe thanks to Lee Epstein, Will Howell, and Steve Levitt 
for their thoughts and ideas.  I also thank participants in the University of Chicago Empirical Economics 
Seminar and the Boston College Law School Tax Colloquium.   
1 Political scientists and students of war define a “major use of force” as instances that involve nuclear 
capabilities or the mobilization of multiple aircraft carrier task groups, battalions, or combat wings.  See 
William Howell & Jon C. Pevehouse, President, Congress, and the Use of Force, 59 INTERNAT’L ORG. 
209, 217 (2005) (describing and defining major and minor uses of force).  The major wars of the 20th 
century include, WWI (1917-18), WWII (1941-45), the Korean War (1950-53), the Vietnam War (1964-
72), and the Gulf War (1990-91).  For a discussion of Congress’ role in major wars versus minor wars, see 
WILLIAM HOWELL & JON C. PEVEHOUSE, WHEN DANGERS GATHER (2007). 
2 Hannah Fischer, Kim Klarman, & Mari-Jan Oboroceanu, American War and Military Operations 
Casualties:  Lists and Statistics, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (June 29, 2007); see also, Howard 
Chernik & Andrew F. Haughwout, Tax Policy and the Fiscal Cost of Disasters:  NY and 9/11, 59 NAT’L 
TAX J. 651 (2006) (discussion of tax costs associated with a direct attack on the nation rather than the 
deployment of troops); David Karol & Edward Miguel, The Electoral Cost of War:  Iraq Casualties and 
the 2004 Presidential Election, 69 J. POL. 633 (2007) (discussion of the political costs of war).  
3 See Center for Strategic Budget Assessments, February 2002 at http://www.csbaonline.org/2006-
1/2.DefenseBudget/Federal_Budget.shtml.   The data for fiscal years 1934-07 is based on Department of 
Defense and Office of Management and Budget data; fiscal years 1910-1933 is based on the Congressional 
Research Service and Office of Management and Budget data; fiscal year 1910-29 figures are for defense 
as a share of GNP not GDP. [explain more].   
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Figure 1: Defense Expenditures as Proportion of GDP 
 
 
    
 
Note:  This figure was crafted by the Center for Strategic Budget Assessment (the war signals are mine); the original 
figure can be viewed at http://www.csbaonline.org/2006-1/2.DefenseBudget/Federal_Budget.shtml. 
  
The fiscal challenges brought about by the first three wars of the 20th century 
highlight a curious question:  How did the U.S. government manage to raise the funds 
necessary to pay for these expensive and largely unexpected military endeavors?  Many 
economic and legal historians have investigated this question and all provide remarkably 
similar accounts of fundraising during times of international crises.  The authors note that 
in times of war, the executive and legislative branches tend to set aside ideological and 
political differences and work quickly and efficiently to raise taxes and implement new 
rules to preserve national security.4  Wars, scholars argue, present the conditions 
necessary to enable Congress and the President to adopt legislation that greatly expands 
the existing tax structure; in peacetime, these same reforms would be controversial and 
could take years to negotiate and ratify—if they get ratified at all.5  Because wartime tax 
policymaking in the early 20th century is so widely perceived to be unique and to have 
had lasting effects on the law even after the hostilities ceased, scholars argue, “to ignore 
war is to ignore the single most important influence on the formation and structure of the 
                                                
4 Scholars that have investigated the affects of war on congressional decision-making include: STEVEN A. 
BANK, KIRK J. STARK, JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, WAR AND TAXES:  IS THERE AN AMERICAN TRADITION OF 
WARTIME FISCAL SACRIFICE? 2 (2008, forthcoming); JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1985); W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA:  A SHORT 
HISTORY (1996); W. Elliot Brownlee, “Wilson and Financing the Modern State:  The Revenue Act of 
1916,” 129 PROCEEDINGS OF AM. PHIL. SOC. 173-219 (1985); Carolyn Jones, “Class Tax to Mass Tax:  The 
Rise of Propaganda in the Expansion of the Income Tax During World War II,” 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685-737 
(1989); Mark Leff, “The Politics of Sacrifice on the Home Front in World War II,” 77 J. AM. HIST. 129-
318 (1991); for a general discussion of tax policy making in both the legislative and executive branch, see 
THOMAS REESE, POLITICS OF TAXATION (1980). 
5 BROWNLEE, supra note at 1996, WITTE, supra note at 1985. 
World War I 
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tax code” if not the government as a whole.6  In the words of Professors Stark, Banks, 
and Thorndike, “As every student of American taxation knows, war has been the most 
important catalyst for long-term structural change in the nation’s fiscal system.  Indeed, 
the history of America’s tax system can largely be written as a history of American 
wars.”7 
 
The extant literature on wartime taxation is both rich and nuanced; it enables an 
understanding of how we obtained the specific legal rules we have,8 why government 
tends to grow with each new crisis,9 and when we can expect further ground-breaking 
policy changes down the road.10  The literature, however, has focused entirely on the 
elected branches of government.  Missing from the historical account of tax 
policymaking during international crises is the third branch of government:  the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  Of course, many scholars have investigated whether war affects the 
judiciary in the context of civil rights and liberties.11  In particular, these studies have 
sought to determine whether the Court is predisposed to sanction laws that constrain 
individual rights in periods of a national crisis, such as the decision to intern Japanese-
American citizens in World War II.12  No scholar, however, has studied the Court’s 
response to fiscal questions in times of war.  I find the exclusive focus on civil rights 
somewhat surprising given legislators’ obvious belief that tax policy is a key ingredient 
to assuring success in wartime activities. 
 
Perhaps scholars do not perceive the judiciary to be an important policy player in 
fiscal emergencies; after all, courts do not have constitutional authority to draft new 
legislation mandating that individuals or corporations contribute to the federal fisc in 
times war.13  This is a cramped understanding of the Court, however, and one that may 
                                                
6 WITTE, supra note at 1985; ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN:  CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH 
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1987) (arguing wars have ratchet-effect by constantly increasing the power 
of the state).. 
7 BANK, STARK, & THORNDIKE, supra note at 2.  
8 BANK, STARK, & THORNDIKE, supra note at 2. 
9 HIGGS, supra note at 6 
10 WITTE, supra note at 1985; BANK, STARK, & THORNDIKE, supra note at. 
11 For just a few examples, see, e.g., Tom Clark, Judicial Decision Making During Wartime, 3 J. LEG. 
STUD. 397 (2006); Lee Epstein, Daniel Ho, Gary King, & Jeffrey Segal, The Supreme Court During Crisis:  
How War Affects Only Non-War Cases, 80 NYU L, REV. 1-116 (2005):  1-116; Joel Grossman, The 
Japanese American Cases and the Vagaries of Constitutional Adjudication in Wartime:  An Institutional 
Perspective, 19 UNIV. HAW. L. REV. 649 (1997); Neil Katyal & Lawrence Tribe, Waging War, Deciding 
Guilt:  Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L. REV. 1259 (2002). 
12 The scholars that have investigated this question in the context of constitutional rights and liberties have 
reached mixed and often conflicting results.  One explanation for the assorted findings in the extant 
literature is related to the fact that judicial incentive are themselves contradictory in the rights and liberties 
context and thus it is not only impossible to predict ex ante how wars will affect the justices, but the results 
themselves are likely to be sensitive to the specific cases analyzed.  In the fiscal context, by contrast, there 
are various judicial incentives at work but all operate in the same direction—and all in favor the 
government.  For this reason, I am able to identify whether war induces the Court to change its behavior as 
well as why the observed changes occur.  See infra notes and accompanying text. 
13 U.S CONST. Art1, § 1 (all legislative power granted in the Congress of the United States).  The justices, 
however, are free to expand and contract the meaning of civil rights and liberties.  See, infra notes and 
accompanying text. 
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not capture the justices’ ability to impact the budget.  First, data indicate that the justices 
tend to grant certiorari to tax cases that have national revenue implications;14 the 
government, itself, often claims that a Court decision on behalf of the taxpayers in the 
cases it litigates could have detrimental budgetary consequences.15   Second, the justices 
have the power to create rules and standards that favor the government, and thus are 
capable of contributing to war funding by increasing the number of pro-government 
decisions in times of crisis.16  In contexts outside fiscal policy, scholars have argued that 
the justices—rightly or wrongly—do adopt a pro-government stance in times of war, 
thereby enabling Congress and the President far more independence and freedom to 
address the emergency at hand.17  The U.S. Supreme Court, in short, is institutionally 
capable of engaging in the same type of fiscal activities that tax scholars have long 
observed in the elected branches; whether it chooses to do so is an empirical question. 
 
In this essay I take up this question and seek to identify the effects, if any, that war 
has on judicial tax decisions. 19  For purposes of this investigation, I do not examine the 
specific doctrinal rules that emerge during wartime but rather focus on the proportion of 
pro-government outcomes in the cases decided.  As I discuss below, if national crises do 
                                                
14 Nancy Staudt, Agenda Setting In Supreme Court Tax Cases: Lessons From the Blackmun Papers, 52 
BUFF. L. REV. 889 (2005) 
15 Staudt, supra note at ; see also Sup. Ct Rules § (indicating that the Court should grant certiorari to cases 
with national implications and this includes budgetary issues).  
16 Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein, Peter Weidenbeck, Rene Lindstaadt, and Ryan Vender Weilen, Judging 
Statutes, Interpretive Regimes, 39 LOY. L. REV. 1909  (2005). 
17 See, e.g., Norman Dorsen, Foreign Affairs and Civil Liberties, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 840 (1989). 
19 The notion that the justices should or would have different conceptions of the law during wartime than in 
peacetime is unambiguously a controversial proposition.  As I note below, some argue that the justices have 
an obligation to facilitate successful wartime policymaking and thus must defer to Congress the executive 
in times of emergency even if this means setting aside existing standards of law and accepted modes of 
legal interpretation.  Others argue the Court should not defer to national emergency measures, but rather 
subject them to heightened scrutiny precisely because society is more apt tolerate transgressions with 
respect to basic individual rights and entitlements during times of crisis.  I do not take a normative position 
on this question.  Of course, every Court and every justice need not have the same view on this question; 
Silverstein notes that the Court has not taken a consistent position on the matter in the constitutional 
context.  In some eras, the justices have enforced limits on the government’s ability to curb individual 
rights and liberties while at other times the Court has been more lenient and has allowed the national 
government to infringe on civil rights especially when the laws are very specific to the circumstances and 
hand and are written as narrowly as possible. SILVERSTEIN, 107-118. 
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alter the judicial calculus in the fiscal context, I expect the justices will reach a higher 
number of pro-government decisions during the wartime periods than we expect on 
average.20  War may impact the judiciary in many other ways but for now I limit my 
focus to this specific issue.21  
 
This essay is organized as follows.  Section II describes Supreme Court decision-
making in the context of taxation over the course of the last century.  The important and 
notable trend, for purposes of this study, is the fact that the justices rule in favor of the 
U.S. government in the vast majority of cases—70% on average.  The raw data, however, 
indicate this average tends to increase in wartime and decrease in peacetime.  Section III, 
therefore, investigates possible explanations for the heightened deference to the 
government in times of war.  One potential rationale for the observed change in judicial 
behavior is a perceived imbalance in military expertise.  If the justices believe the elected 
branches of government are better-suited to address military crises, the Court is likely to 
adopt a pro-government bias as a means to advance the decisions and policies of the 
experts.  This support for the national government in times of war, in turn, could lead to 
the Court to defer to Congress and the President in all the cases involving the national 
government or to a more restricted deference that leads to accommodation only in 
specific cases involving issues deemed key to a successful wartime strategy.  A second 
potential explanation for the justices pro-government stance may not be associated with 
the belief that the elected officials are more competent to address the crisis at-hand, but 
due to feelings of heightened nationalism that citizens tend to experience when the 
country is threatened by forces abroad.   
 
These motivations might work singly or in combination with each other, but it is 
worthwhile to examine all three in order to understand fully the factors that explain how 
and why the justices contribute to wartime funding.  Accordingly, Section IV further 
examines the data in an effort to identify the actual mechanism at work.  Section IVA 
discusses three simple statistical models that I will use to understand why the justices 
change their behavior from wartime to peacetime; Section IVB discusses the underlying 
assumptions of the models and possible biases; and Section IVC presents the empirical 
findings.   
 
After controlling for possible confounding factors, I find that the justices in fact do 
defer to the federal government in tax cases during wartime periods and that the most 
likely explanation for this deference is not associated not with an irrational exuberance 
for federal policymakers in times of crisis, but to the perceived imbalance in expertise 
when it comes to military matters.  The inclination to accommodate, however, does not 
lead to the maximum possible level of deference to the government in tax cases, but 
rather to a limited form; the Court does not increase the number of pro-government 
decisions across-the-board, but only in cases raising issues that Congress and the 
President have signaled to be important to the war through legislative activity. 
                                                
20 A qualitative analysis of the specific rules that emerge during wartime would be a very interesting and 
useful endeavor but is beyond the scope of this article. 
21 War, for example, may impact the size of the docket or the Court’s approach to statutory interpretation. 
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These findings seriously challenge the conventional views of the role of Supreme 
Court justices in both our system of separated powers and in national policymaking.  
First, the generally held view of the Court is that justices stand above majoritarian 
politics and thus operate as a check on the extremist policies that can (and often do) 
emerge from the elected branches of government.  This conception of the Court appears 
to hold only during peacetime periods; during wartime, the justices are willing to unleash 
Congress and the President from the constraints associated with judicial review, thereby 
enabling them to exercise quite a bit more freedom and autonomy to address the 
international crisis at-hand.  Second, these findings suggest that the justices believe the 
effects of their decisions go well beyond the individual litigants in the case; indeed, the 
justices seem to shift their focus from one that protects the micro-level rights and 
interests of individual taxpayers to macro-level policies that implicate the nation as a 
whole.  This judicial transformation raises the question of whether the justices have 
similar macro-level views when domestic emergencies arise, such as those involving 
economic crises, housing crises, immigration crises, or old-age crises.   
 
 
II. TRENDS IN JUDICIAL FISCAL POLICY  
 
 The United States spent seventeen years, or nearly one-fifth of the entire 
Twentieth Century, engaged in five major military activities at a cost of nearly $5 
trillion.22  In order to understand the judicial response to these wartime costs, it is 
worthwhile to examine briefly just how the wars affected fiscal policymaking in the 
elected branches of government.  After all, if Congress, the President, and the nation at-
large did not consider wartime costs to be a pressing national concern, then it is unlikely 
that the justices would modify their own decision-making calculus when issuing opinions 
in the tax cases that emerged onto their docket.   
 
Countless economic historians have studied the effects of war on legislative tax 
policymaking, including Joseph Shumpeter, Randolph E. Paul, Sidney Ratner, Elliot 
Brownlee, John Witte, Robert Higgs and most recently Steven Banks, Kirk Stark, and 
Joseph Thorndike—to name just a few.23  With the help of both theory and data, each of 
these authors, or teams of authors, have made important contributions to our 
understanding of wartime legislative fiscal decisions. 24  Surprisingly, the scholars all tell 
very similar stories about how tax policy is made as well as the changes in the fiscal 
                                                
22 The major wars of the 20th century include, WWI (1917-18), WWII (1941-45), the Korean War (1950-
53), the Vietnam War (1964-72), and the Gulf War (1990-91).  See supra note and accompanying text. 
23 JOSEPH SHUMPETER, RANDOLPH PAUL, SIDNEY RATNER, BROWNLEE, supra note at ; WITTE, supra note 
at; HIGGS, supra note  at, BANKS, STARK, & THORNDIKE, supra note at 
24 These authors have primarily relied on qualitative data for purposes of understanding the decisions that 
Congress and the President have made and for this reason much more work must to be done before we can 
understand fully the nature and role of military threats, politics, and economics on wartime decision-
making.  For purposes of this study, however, I set aside the interesting quantitative questions and simply 
offer a brief summary of what is by now a familiar story on how the American government has paid for its 
wartime endeavors. 
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framework that emerged in each wartime era.  Congress and the President increased tax 
rates in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War to conspicuously high levels in 
an effort to fund the extraordinary and unexpected costs of national defense.25  The 
elected officials also increased taxes during the Vietnam and Gulf Wars, but not 
immediately and not to the same extreme levels observed in earlier war periods.26  
Scholars also note, however, that when Congress and the President looked to the 
taxpayers as a revenue source, the reforms were not always identical.  In WWI, for 
example, Congress relied heavily on corporate entities;27 in WWII and the Korean War, 
Congress increased the tax burdens on both corporations and individuals, but relied quite 
a bit more on individual taxpayers as a source of revenue;28 and in the Vietnam and Gulf 
Wars, Congress raised individual tax rates to a far greater extent than corporate rates but 
the reforms were relatively minor compared to those adopted in earlier periods and may 
not have been motivated by wartime fiscal pressures at all.  
 
Figure 2 presents data on the level of corporate and individual tax receipts as a 
percentage of the GDP over the course of the Twentieth Century and reflect the 
congressional decisions made in each wartime era.29  The grey trend-line reflects 
corporate tax receipts and the black trend-line indicates individual receipts as a 
proportion of the GDP in each year.  It is easy to see that Congress relied on different 
groups to different degrees in WWI, WWII, and the Korean War, but that no obvious 
reforms are correlated with the Vietnam or Gulf Wars.  
 
The question I investigate is whether these wartime reforms had any effect on 
Supreme Court decision-making.  The justices, of course, have no direct involvement in 
determining just how the country funds wartime activities, but they are indirectly 
involved when they issue opinions that address taxpayer obligations during the crisis 
periods.  In fact, between the years 1909 and 2000, the time period of this study, 
Congress voted on roughly 2,000 tax bills while the justices issued opinions in 1,113 tax 
cases.  This suggests that while Congress was busy drafting the laws, the Supreme Court 
was busy interpreting them in the context of disputes that made their way onto the 
docket.30 
                                                
25 BROWNLEE, supra note at ; WITTE, supra note at; HIGGS, supra note  at, BANKS, STARK, & THORNDIKE, 
supra note at 
26 BANKS, STARK, & THORNDIKE, supra note at 
27 BROWNLEE, supra note at ; WITTE, supra note at; HIGGS, supra note  at, BANKS, STARK, & THORNDIKE, 
supra note at 
28 BANKS, STARK, & THORNDIKE, supra note at 
29 This graph is an updated version of a graph originally created by John Witte, see WITTE, supra note.  See 
also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS:  HISTORICAL STATISTICS (2007) (underlying data on 
tax receipts by year) available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/hist_stats.html; LOUIS 
JOHNSTON & SAMUEL WILLIMASON, U.S. GDP, 1789-2002 available at 
http://eh.net/hmit/gdp/GDPsource.2003.htm (for underlying GDP data). 
30 The study begins with the year 1909 because this is the year in which Congress adopted the modern 
corporate income tax; four years later, Congress adopted the modern income tax has not substantially 
changed the structure of the tax since that time.  See [Code cites].  The Lexis search that we conducted read 
as follows: (federal w/s tax!) or (excise w/s tax!) or (estate w/s tax!) or (user w/5 fee) or (user w/s tax!) or 
(tax! w/s fraud) or (irc) or (i.r.c.) or (stamp w/s tax!) or (income w/s tax!) or (internal w/s revenue) or (tax! 
w/s lien) or (tax! w/s code) or (tax! w/s evad!) or (tax! w/s evasion) or (corporate w/s tax!) or (payroll w/s 
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*Note:  This graph is an updated version of a graph created by John Witte.  
 
For purposes of this study, I examine the 1,113 Court opinions issued during the 
Twentieth Century and compare outcomes in wartime versus peacetime.   In order to 
understand the underlying my goals, it is useful to conceptualize this study as a “quasi-
experiment.”  Just as medical studies seek to identify the effects, if any, of a treatment on 
the outcome of a patient—I seek to identify whether war has any effects on judicial 
outcomes.  Economists label this type of study a “natural experiment” or a “quasi-
experiment” because the treatment (the war) emerged through exogenous 
circumstances.31  In a true experimental setting, the researcher generally assigns subjects 
randomly into two (or more groups) and then applies the treatment to one group and uses 
the other as a control or comparison group.32  Obviously, I did not randomly divide the 
justices into two groups and then impose wars on one group and not the other in order to 
investigate how the justices would respond.  Rather the wars emerged from a 
combination of national and international and factors that had nothing to do with the 
justices and everything to do with the preferences of the sitting Congress and President at 
the time the crisis emerged.33  Nonetheless, I am able to take advantage of these 
conditions for purposes of identifying and understanding the effects of war on the 
Supreme Court decision-making process.34  I will address the advantages and possible 
disadvantages of this natural experiment further below, but before that discussion, I 
describe the characteristics of the tax cases decided by the Court.35 
                                                                                                                                            
tax!) or (employment w/s tax!) or (social w/s security) or (26 usc) or (26 u.s.c.) or (tax! w/s refund) or (tax! 
w/s deficiency) or (unemployment w/s tax!) or (gift w/s tax!) or (fica w/s tax!) or (f.i.c.a. w/s tax!). 
31 See Bruce Meyer, Natural and Quasi-Experiments in Economics, 13 J. BUS. & ECON. STATS. 151 
(1995). 
32  
33 See infra notes and accompanying text (discussing legislative and executive war powers.) 
34 Many scholars look to natural or quasi-experiments for purposes of understanding the affects of one 
variable on another.  See, e.g., DAVID CARD & ALAN KREUGGER, MINIMUM WAGE (2000). 
35 Many scholars investigating the effects of war on courts also have a natural experiment, but do not frame 
the issue as such.  See, Clark, supra note at.  Others, however, adopt a different methodological approach to 
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As noted above, between the years 1909 and 2000, the Court granted certiorari to 
1,113 cases in which taxpayers challenged tax laws as unconstitutional or simply as 
misinterpreted by the Internal Revenue Service.  Although roughly 5% of the Court’s 
docket has been comprised of taxation cases throughout the period of this study, the 
actual number of cases has fluctuated quite a bit each term.  At the highpoint of tax 
decision-making, the 1930s, the Court issued 386 tax opinions but both before and after 
that time the justices granted certiorari to far fewer cases.  In fact, after the 1930s, the tax 
caseload was on a downward trend and by the 1950s the number of federal tax cases on 
the docket leveled off to approximately five controversies per term.  Figure 3 depicts the 
distribution of the cases (the shaded areas represent wartime periods) and indicates the 
spike in the Court’s caseload in the1930’s but no similarly dramatic spikes in other eras, 
wartime or peacetime.  
 





After collecting the data, I analyzed each case individually and identified a wide 
range of factors, including:  1) the type of party involved in the case (corporate, 
individual, estate and so forth), 2) the Court’s reason for granting certiorari, 3) the 
Court’s interpretive approach for deciding the case, 4) the complexity of the case, 5) the 
level of media coverage, 6) the Court’s ideology at the time it issued the opinion, and 7) 
the prevailing party in the lower federal court.  My coding decisions are explained in the 
appendix and the statistics are summarized in Table 1 below.  Column 2 in the Table 
presents the average of each case characteristic over the entire period of the study, and 
Columns 3 and 4 disaggregate this information, depicting case characteristics in wartime 
and peacetime, separately.  All the cases, for example, raised a statutory claim so there is 
literally no difference between the cases on this dimension.  Looking further down the 
table, we can see that the justices granted certiorari in 7% of all the cases to address an 
                                                                                                                                            
uncover the effects of war.  See, Epstein, Ho, King & Segal, supra note at (adopting a method of 
matching). 
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“important question, but this number increased to 9% in wartime and decreased to 6% in 
peacetime.  
 
In order to conduct a valid natural experiment and to make useful comparisons 
between cases decided in peacetime and wartime, it is important that that the two groups 
of cases (the control group and the treatment group) are similar on all relevant facets.  
Accordingly, I have bolded the case characteristics that are statistically and significantly 
different during peacetime and wartime; that is to say, we can say with 95% confidence 
that the wartime and peacetime cases differed on the bolded factors but we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the cases are the same on the factors left unbolded.36  Table 1 
indicates that the cases are nearly identical in 10 of the 13 categories listed; the primary 
differences, include the number of constitutional claims alleged—10% during wartime 
and 15% in peacetime; the number of individual taxpayers involved in the lawsuits—23% 
in wartime and 18% in peacetime; and the Court’s ideology—liberal in both periods but 
quite a bit more liberal in wartime than peacetime.  I discuss these differences further 
below, as well as their implications for this study,37 but for now I simply present a 
summary of the dataset. 
 











Statutory Claim 100% 100% 100%  
Constitutional Claim 14% 10% 15% 
Corporate Taxpayers 35% 34% 35% 
Individual Taxpayers 19% 23% 18% 
Other Taxpayers 46% 44% 47% 
Court’s Ideology(negative score=liberal) -.2203 -.3542 -.1284 
Judicial Reliance on Substantive Methods 47% 49% 46% 
Judicial Reliance on Textual Methods 38% 37% 38% 
Taxpayer Won in Lower Federal Court 54% 55% 53% 
Media Coverage 4% 5% 3% 
Certiorari to Resolve “Important Question” 7% 9% 6% 
Certiorari Granted Without Explanation  45% 42% 49% 
Cases with Just One Issue 92% 91% 93% 
 
*  Note:  Statistics indicate percentage of cases in dataset with the exception of the “Court’s Ideology” where the mean 
ideology score is presented. Variables that are bolded indicate a statistically significant difference between wartime and 
peacetime with a p-value < .05. 
  
                                                
36 To determine whether a statistically significant difference exists during wartime and peacetime, I used a 
difference in proportions test for the all the variables except the Court’s ideology, for which I used a t-test.  
The difference in proportions was determined in the following way: 
! 
ˆ "1 # ˆ " 2
ˆ " 1(1# ˆ " 2)(1/n1 + 1/n 2)
 
where subscript 2 denotes wartime, subscript 1 denotes peacetime, and π is the percentage of the variable 
that obtains in each era.  See BINARY AND DISCRETE VARIABLES (2000) (useful discussion of statistical 
analysis of binary data. 
37 See infra notes and accompanying text. 
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 The variables examined in Table 1 are important (as I discuss further below) but 
the specific variable of interest in this study is the government win-rate.  On average, the 
U.S. government wins the vast majority of tax cases that it litigates in the Supreme 
Court—70%—but this percentage decreases to 68% in peacetime and increases to 73% 
during wartime.  Figure 3 depicts the percentage of cases in which government prevails 
over each Supreme Court term from 1909 though 2000, using a lowess smother.38  The y-
axis indicates the percentage of pro-government decisions and the x-axis is the Supreme 
Court term; shading indicates the Court issued the opinion in a wartime period.  Note the 
spikes in the early wartime periods, WWI, WWII, and the Korean War, suggesting that 
war is indeed affecting the justices’ decision-making process.  There is a small increase 
in the number of pro-government decision in the Vietnam War but no such trend in the 
Gulf War.  Figure 3 also depicts non-wartime spikes and most notably a spike in the late 
1920s and early 1930s; this suggests that the Court may not be responsive only to wars, 
but to any major crisis that emerges, whether domestic or foreign in nature. 
 
Figure 4:  Government Win Rate Over Time 
 
   
 
*  Note:  Graph depicts government win-rate using the lowess technique.  The bandwith is 0.1 (which states that the 
smoothing window has a total width of 10% of the horizontal axis variable) and thus the lowess curve follows the 
individual data points closely. 
 
 Figure 3 illustrates government’s win-rates in the aggregated data, but it is also 
possible to examine different types of cases and parties separately.  As indicated in the 
summary statistics in Table 1 above, the two largest groups of taxpayers that brought 
claims to the Supreme Court were corporate entities and individuals challenging the 
income tax.  Moreover, Congress focused on each of these two groups to different 
degrees in each wartime period as Figure 2 indicates.  Thus if the Court pays any 
attention to the specific type of reform implemented by the elected branches of 
                                                
38 Lowess is an acronym for “locally weighted scatterplot smoother” and is a procedure used to examine 
trends in the data over time.  For a discussion of this procedure, see JOHN FOX, APPLIED REGRESSION 
ANALYSIS, LINEAR MODELS, AND RELATED METHODS 419-24 (1997). 
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government, we might expect to observe corporate and individual taxpayers treated 
differently in each wartime period.   
 
The raw data indicates that corporations and individuals win, on average, just .3 
of the cases they litigate in the Supreme Court.  These averages, however, change 
dramatically if we condition the five different major wartime periods of the Twentieth 
Century.  Table 2 presents a comparison of the government win-rates vis-à-vis corporate 
and individual taxpayers in different eras.  The first row indicates that the government 
won 67% of the corporate cases and 68% of the individual cases during peacetime.  Row 
2 depicts dramatic shifts in these win-rates during WWI—the government won 80% of 
the corporate cases and just 29% of the individual cases.  In WWI, the trend shifted and 
the government won 64% and 84% of the corporate and individual cases, respectively.  
The Korean War showed an even lower corporate win-rate of 33% and a 70% win-rate in 
the individual taxpayer context.  During the Vietnam War, the government won a high 
percentage of the cases in both groups, 76% and 77%, respectively.  Finally, the Court 
decided just one tax case during the Gulf War and the government prevailed.  These 
trends do not appear to be random, all the wartime win-rates are statistically significantly 
different from the peacetime averages.  Thus we can conclude that based on very 
preliminary findings, wartime crises are leading the Court to act very differently than it 
does in peacetime. 
 
Table 2:  Comparison of Wartime & Peacetime Courts by Taxpayer-Type  
 
 Government Win Rates  






Peacetime Average 67% 68% 
WWI 80% 29% 
WWII 64% 84% 
Korean War 33% 70% 
Vietnam War 76% 77% 
Gulf War 0%  100% 
 
*  Note:  All the bolded wartime government win-rates are statistically significantly different from the peacetime 
averages with a p-value < .05. 
 
The raw data presented in the Figures and Tables above suggest several factors 
about legislative and judicial decision-making trends in peacetime and wartime.  First, the 
three major wars in the early Twentieth Century, WWI, WWII, and the Korean War, led 
Congress and the President to adopt quick and dramatic tax reforms, but no such 
extraordinary legal changes emerged in either the Vietnam or Gulf Wars.  Second, 
taxpayers litigate quite a few controversies in the Supreme Court and while the claims, 
parties, interpretive methods, and so forth are all very similar in both wartime and 
peacetime, the government win-rates differed significantly in each period.  Third, foreign 
crises do not always lead the Supreme Court to issue to pro-government opinions, rather 
the outcome appears to be linked to the specific party involved and perhaps to the 
specific type of legislation adopted by Congress prior to the time the litigation started.   
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Most legal scholars believe the Supreme Court is an independent body of 
decision-makers,39 designed by the Framers to act in a manner that is both separate and 
apart from the elected branches of government.   Indeed, many scholars have argued that 
for the Supreme Court justices to conform their decisions to the preferences of Congress 
and the President is tantamount to the Court failing in its constitutional obligation to 
protect individuals from the extremist laws that are likely to emerge in the democratic 
process.40  Why, then, would the justices transform their choice calculus to account for 
the actions of the majoritarian bodies in times of war, thereby undermining their role as 
an independent body in our system of separated powers? In the next section, I investigate 
this question and identify various judicial incentives that could explain the trends 
observed above.  
 
 
III. JUDICIAL INCENTIVE STRUCTURES IN WARTIME AND PEACETIME 
 
 Many scholars have investigated the effects of war on Supreme Court justices.41  
All the studies, however, focus on judicial decisions that involve individual civil rights 
and liberties and none seek to understand whether war plays a role in the judicial fiscal 
context.  One famous case, for example, that has received quite a bit of attention is 
Korematsu v. United States,42 which considered President Roosevelt’s executive order 
allowing local military commanders to forcibly remove and intern Japanese and Japanese 
Americans from the West Coast during World War II.  Fred Korematsu refused to obey 
the order arguing internment violated his rights under the constitution, but the justices 
found that no such violation had occurred.43  Various scholars argue that the justices 
found a violation only because of the looming crisis, whereas others argue the justices 
were not at all impacted by the international threats that existed at the time.44  Professors 
Epstein, Ho, King, and Segal’s study, the only large-N quantitative study of the question, 
supports the latter viewpoint.45  I do not seek to arbitrate between these two views but 
only to point to the fact that the existing literature has focused entirely on Supreme Court 
cases involving constitutional rights and liberties and has completely disregarded all 
other types of wartime decision-making, such as the cases involving public finance.  I 
find the exclusive focus on rights and liberties surprising given that Congress and the 
President have long viewed fiscal policy to be a key component of a winning military 
strategy.  In fact, various studies suggest that the most controversial aspects of wartime 
                                                
39 In both the law and political science literature, most scholars seem to suggest that the Supreme Court 
(whether driven by politics, law, or some combination of the two) behaves in a manner that is separate and 
apart from the legislative and executive branches of government.  [List authors]  
40 See discussion, infra notes and accompanying text. 
41 See supra note ; see also, Epstein, Ho, King, and Segal, supra note at notes 13 & 14 (listing numerous 
books and articles on the topic). 
42 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
43 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944) (Court acknowledged that the U.S. government imposed serious hardships 
on Japanese-American citizens, but noted that in wartime citizens must submit to heavy burdens that are 
commensurate with the threatened danger). 
44  
45 Epstein, Ho, King, and Segal, supra note. 
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decision-making in Congress involve the funding mechanisms and not the initial decision 
to go war.  More fundamentally, it is likely that the conclusions in the extant literature 
with respect to rights and liberties are not generalizable to all other legal contexts, 
especially those involving taxation.    
 
In this Section, I explain why the justices may have very different incentive 
structures in civil rights/liberties cases than in tax cases.  I then examine various judicial 
incentives that exist and explain their impact on the government’s likelihood of winning a 
tax case in wartime versus peacetime.  I find the pro-government incentives are quite a bit 
stronger in controversies involving fiscal policy than those involving civil rights and 
liberties cases and thus I expect a stronger correlation between wartime decision-making 
and government success than identified in the extant literature.  
 
A. Incentive Structures in Constitutional and Statutory Cases:  Distinctions that 
Matter.  
 
In order to understand judicial incentive structures and how they might impact 
outcomes, it is important to understand key differences between civil rights-type cases, 
which generally involve constitutional questions, and tax cases, which generally involve 
issues of statutory interpretation.46  Because these cases raise very different issues, the 
justices have distinct decision-making procedures in each context and this, in turn, could 
lead to different wartime effects in the two contexts.   
 
In the constitutional context, the Court is faced with the question of whether or 
not Congress or the President has overstepped the bounds of power as spelled out in the 
Constitution.  In these types of cases, the Court is the final arbiter and, at least in theory, 
the other two branches of government have no recourse whatsoever.47  Put differently, if 
the Court declares an action, decision, or order to be unconstitutional then Congress 
and/or the President must suspend the program or policy.48  More directly, if the justices 
determined the presidential order permitting the internment of Japanese-Americans to be 
a violation of individual rights and liberties, the military commanders would have been 
forced to dismantle the camps immediately.  Fred Korematsu’s criminal conviction for 
violating the military order to evacuate his hometown and report to a military center 
would have been overturned by the Supreme Court. 
                                                
46 Although it is certainly possible that civil rights cases involve issues of statutory interpretation and tax 
cases involve constitutional questions, this is not the norm.  In my dataset, for example, the Court issues 
1,113 decisions and just 14% (n=156) raised one or more constitutional issues.  Additionally, constitutional 
and statutory issues are not mutually exclusive.  In the 1918 case, Towne v. Eisner, the Court considered 
the question of whether a new income tax provision was constitutional and even if it was, if it could be 
interpreted to impose a tax only on earned income (such as wages or salary) or whether the statute should 
be read broadly to tax unearned income (such as stock dividends). Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918). 
47 Some scholars argue that while it is true the justices have the last word on the constitutionality of a law, 
legislators are able to punish the justices in various ways if their decisions do not conform to congressional 
preferences the preferences.  See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICE JUSTICES MAKE (1995).  
Threatened sanctions, in turn, induce justices to change their views in some circumstances.  But see, Jeffrey 
Segal, AM. J. POL. SCI. (1996) (arguing legislative threats have no impact on judicial behavior). 
48  
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In the statutory interpretation context, by contrast, the justices are only required to 
resolve the question of whether and how a particular statute should govern the parties and 
transactions in the controversy at hand, there is no question that the elected branches of 
government acted with the bounds of their constitutional authority.49  Taxpayers raising 
statutory claims, for example, will argue that the tax laws, as currently written do not 
impose the tax burden alleged to exist by the IRS; the IRS simply misunderstood or 
misinterpreted the statute.  Most importantly for purposes of this study, Congress and the 
President are not obligated to adhere to the Court’s decision in a statutory case.  
Irrespective of the Court’s determination in the case, regardless of the legal grounds 
relied upon, and whether or not the decision favors the taxpayer or the government—
legislators are completely free to overturn the Court’s ruling.50  In fact, Congress has 
disagreed with judicial interpretations of the tax law in the past and has responded with 
legislative overrides in cases such as Gitlitz v. Commissioner,51 Commissioner v. Lundy,52 
Commissioner v. Soliman,53 and Commissionerr v. Asphalt,54 to name just a few.55  As 
noted above, the elected branches of government do not have this freedom in 
constitutional cases—they are obligated to adhere to the Court’s ruling. 
 
This difference is important for purposes of understanding judicial incentives for 
accommodating or constraining Congress and the President in wartime.  In the 
constitutional context, the Supreme Court, as the third branch of government, is 
responsible for assuring that Congress and the President do not violate individual rights 
and liberties at any time—including during periods of international emergencies.  In 
peacetime and in wartime, the justices must assure that the elected branches of 
government obey the constraints as set out in the U.S. Constitution.  In short the 
constitutional provisions—as the Framers’ drafted them—apply whether or not there is a 
declaration of war.  In statutory contexts, by contrast, the Court’s responsibility is very 
different and far more deferential to the elected branches of government.  The justices’ 
sole goal is to ascertain the meaning of law as adopted by Congress and then to apply it to 
the taxpayers in Court.  To put the distinction between constitutional and statutory cases 
in the most extreme form:  In constitutional cases, the justices’ goal is to implement the 
preferences of the Framers while in statutory cases the justices seek to execute the 
preferences of the legislative and executive branches of government.   
 
That the justices’ role in statutory cases is to facilitate the aims and goals of the 
majoritarian bodies—and not second-guess them—suggests that the Court will generally 
issue rulings favorable to the U.S. government.  In fact, as noted above, the government 
does win the vast majority of tax cases that it litigates in the Supreme Court.  But this fact 
                                                
49  
50 See Nancy Staudt, Rene Lindstadt, and Jason O’Connor, Judicial Decisions as Legislation: 
Congressional Oversight of Supreme Court Tax Cases, 1954-2004 NYU (2007) 
51 531 U.S. 206 (2001). 
52 516 U.S. 235 (1996). 
53 506 U.S. 168 (1993). 
54 482 U.S. 117 (1997). 
55 Staudt, et al, supra note at.. 
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does not answer the question posed, namely, do the justices read and interpret the tax 
laws during times of war in a manner that changes the probability that the U.S. 
government will prevail?  The description of the data in Section I above suggests that the 
government win-rates do change when the country moves into a period of international 
crisis; I now seek to unpack the incentives that explain this change.  
 
B. Unpacking Judicial Incentives (and Disincentives) to Defer.  
 
The justices have both incentives and disincentives to accommodate the 
majoritarian branches of government in times of war.  The extant literature has identified 
three incentives and two disincentives that are the most salient for understanding judicial 
decision-making.56  I discuss each separately and note that judicial preferences will lead 
the Court to defer to the federal government quite a bit more in statutory cases and less in 
controversies that raise constitutional questions.57  If my analysis is accurate, we should 
observe different outcomes in constitutional and fiscal decision-making in times of war.  
This means that the existing findings in the quantitative literature do not have external 
validity (they are not generalizable to all areas of the law) and thus empirical studies of 
unique legal areas are necessary before we can understand fully how war affects Supreme 
Court justices. 
 
Beginning first with the judicial incentives to defer in times of war.  To 
understand these incentives, it is useful to note that the Constitution, itself, implies that 
the Supreme Court justices should not directly involve themselves in the wartime 
decision-making process.  The Framers, for example, explicitly granted war powers to the 
executive and legislative branches of government but were completely silent with respect 
to the judiciary.  Specifically, Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the power “to 
declare War” and “raise and support armies.”58  Similarly, Article II provides that the 
President “shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.”59   
 
Many scholars have argued that Articles I and II—along with the absence of any 
language suggesting the Court has a role to play in wartime activities—indicate that the 
Framers viewed the elected branches of government as better equipped to handle national 
emergencies than the justices on the Supreme Court.60  At times, the justices themselves 
have expressed agreement with this view of their role in wartime policymaking.  In 
Hirabayashi v. United States, for example, the Court wrote that the federal government’s  
“power to wage war is the power to wage war successfully,” suggesting that the justices 
must not interfere in any way with the other two branches of government as they seek to 
execute a successful military strategy.61  Similarly, in Licheter v. US, Justice Burton 
                                                
56 The best description of the incentives can be found in Epstein, Ho, King, & Segal, supra note at. 
57 For a summary of the incentives and disincetives in the constitutional and statutory contexts, see Table 3, 
infra notes and accompanying text. 
58 U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8. 
59 U.S. CONST. ART. II, §§ 1,2. 
60  
61 Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579 (1952). 
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noted that often extreme economic polices were necessary in times of war and the justices 
should not second-guess congressional strategies.  In Burton’s words, “In total war it is 
necessary that a civilian make sacrifices of his property and profits with at least the same 
fortitude as that with which a drafted soldier makes his traditional sacrifices of comfort, 
security, and life itself. . . . In war, both the raising and the support of the armed forces 
are essential and legitimate acts of Congress.”62  Finally, Justice Jackson has argued that 
for the Court to interfere with the strategies of the elected branches of government during 
wartime is to interpret the Framers as having placed a higher priority on individual rights 
and interests than protecting the security and viability of the nation as a whole.  This 
Jackson argued is akin to a “suicide pact” which cannot be what the Framer’s had in mind 
when they created the Supreme Court as the third branch of government.63 
 
 Underlying this notion of deference and accommodation is the idea that the 
justices—like most Americans—have a strong preference for national security and that 
individual rights and interests must be sacrificed for the greater good.  Moreover, because 
the Justices—like the Framers—seem to recognize that it is the elected officials of 
government who have the knowledge, the expertise, and the skill to make informed 
decisions on whether to go to war, how to fund the war, and, ultimately, how to win the 
war, their choices must be respected.  The justices, experts in constitutional law and 
statutory interpretation, are not in a position to second-guess the wartime decisions and 
thus are able to maximize their own well-being—there safety and the safety of the 
nation—by stepping aside to allow the elected branches of government to do their job 
effectively.  The incentive to defer and accommodate may exist at all times, but arguably 
will be particularly strong when the stakes are high, as in periods of major wars, and 
when a substantial number of personnel in the federal government are actively seeking to 
address the emergency at hand.64  In these periods, judicial interference arguably could 
exacerbate rather than ameliorate the crisis and thus deference is exceptionally important. 
 
 The specific form of judicial accommodation to Congress and the President, if it 
emerges at all, however, is not entirely clear.  On the one hand, the justices may pursue a 
“strong form of deference” by issuing pro-government decisions in all the cases litigated 
irrespective of the nature of the claims or the types of parties involved.65  This general 
form of deference would help to assure the federal government creates uniform policy in 
times of crisis, rather than a fragmented approach to lawmaking that depends on the 
specific issue at hand.  General deference would assure that the experts, the elected 
branches of government, have total control of policymaking in all areas of fiscal policy 
                                                
62 334 U.S. 742 (1948). 
63 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J. dissenting). 
64 Courts adopting the accommodationist approach may do much more than merely decide in favor of the 
federal government in the cases on the docket, they may also adopt new standard and rules for reaching the 
pro-government outcomes.  Once a wartime emergency has emerged, for example, the justices are free to 
adopt a “wartime standard of review,” which may be quite a bit more deferential to the government than 
cases emerging during peacetime periods. This assures that the Court reaches a pro-government outcome 
but also gives clear instructions to lower federal courts to follow suit.  In civil rights and liberties cases, the 
justices have indicated that this is precisely the approach that should be adopted.  See Epstein, Ho, King, & 
Segal, supra note at . 
65 [Perhaps Clark discusses this?] 
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during crisis periods.  On the other hand, the Court may adopt a “weak form of 
deference,” which would involve accommodation of the majoritarian bodies on issues 
that Congress and the President have explicitly and unambiguously addressed, but not 
deference generally or in every case involving the U.S. government that shows up on the 
docket.  If deference emerges in this second, weak form, the Court will feel free to pursue 
its own preferences in times of crisis in the cases that raise issues to which neither 
Congress nor the President have not spoken.66 
 
In the tax context, these different types of deference have very different 
implications for the government as a litigator in the Supreme Court.  If the justices adopt 
the strong form—deference in all cases—then the government’s win rate should increase 
in all the cases it litigates.  But if the justices pursue the weak form of deference, then the 
government’s chances of prevailing should depend on the types of law that Congress 
adopted to address the wartime emergency.  As noted above, Congress did adopt very 
different strategies for funding wars over the course of the last century.  In World War I, 
Congress primarily focused on corporate taxpayers for purposes of raising funds, whereas 
it financed World War II and the Korean War through a massive tax increase on both 
individual citizens and corporate entities but individuals shouldered the greatest portion 
of the wartime fiscal burden.67  The Vietnam and Gulf Wars ushered in fiscal policy 
changes that focused on individuals rather than corporations, but the new reforms were 
not as dramatic or speedy as those undertaken in the earlier wartime periods.68  Thus if 
the Court adopts a weak form of deference, government win rates are likely to change but 
only in cases that involve the type of taxpayer and they type of law addressed by 
Congress.  Specifically, the government should have increased win rates in the WWI 
corporate cases; in the WWII individual tax cases; and the Korean War individual tax 
cases.  But the Vietnam and Gulf Wars should have no any impact whatsoever on the 
Court. 
  
A second incentive the justices have for deferring to Congress and the President 
involves a desire to avoid institutional sanctions, irrespective of the justices’ views of the 
Court’s authority and expertise to contribute to wartime policymaking.  When the Court 
fails to accommodate the elected branches of government, the justices risk a range of 
negative responses to its decisions.69  Put differently, even if the Court believed it could 
usefully contribute to wartime policymaking by undermining and overturning the policies 
adopted by Congress and the President, the justices may hesitate to involve themselves 
out of fear of punishment. In the statutory context, as noted above, Congress is free to 
override the Court with new legislation and these overrides are likely to come quickly 
and clearly, thereby undercutting the Court’s position as a legitimate contributor to 
                                                
66 One team of authors has argued that deference could also come in a third form:  deference in cases 
addressing issues that have not been addressed by Congress or the President but no deference in cases that 
raise questions considered by the elected branch of government.  See Epstein, Ho, King, & Segal, supra 
note at.  Because it is difficult to identify a theory that could motivate this type of deference, I set it aside 
for purposes of this discussion. 
67 See supra notes and accompanying text. 
68 See supra notes and accompanying text. 
69 EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note at. 
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wartime policy.  Although Congress does not have this recourse in constitutional cases, it 
is able to retaliate by eliminating the Court’s jurisdiction to hear classes of cases or, more 
dramatically, by attempting to impeach the individual justices themselves in the face of 
undesired judicial outcomes but these sanctions may take more time and energy to 
implement than those available in the statutory context.  Thus while positive political 
theorists have noted that negative congressional responses to Court opinions make it 
more difficult for the Court to achieve its short-term policy or jurisprudential goals and 
would erode the judiciary’s legitimacy in the long run, they may be quite a bit more 
effective in statutory contexts.70   
 
One final incentive that the justices have for ruling in favor the federal 
government during wartime is not grounded in concerns for wartime expertise or 
institutional factors—or even in rational decision-making—but in individual feelings that 
emerge when the nation is at risk.  A large number of studies have found that when the 
nation is under siege from a perceived international threat, citizens rally around the flag 
and offer increased support for the President.71  This “rally effect” enables the President 
(and Congress) to pursue policies and programs that may not be feasible in peacetime but 
are adopted with support by the populace in crisis situations.  Justices, like Americans 
generally, may experience nationalistic feelings and be more sympathetic to the 
government’s legal positions especially in cases and controversies that impact war 
activities.72  Rally effects are generally short-lived and do not persist throughout the 
entire wartime periods.  Thus, if it is the rally effect, and not the actual war, that 
effectuates changes in judicial decision-making, then we should observe a pro-
government bias while the rally lasts but no longer. 
 
Before turning to the disincentives to defer to Congress and the President, it is 
worthwhile to note that the judicial concerns regarding their own military expertise and 
the behavioral swings that come with a rally effect are specific to wartime eras.  Thus 
these incentives to defer unambiguously imply differences in wartime and peacetime 
government win-rates.  The incentives to defer that are associated with sanctions, 
however, exist in both peacetime and wartime and thus cannot help explain the difference 
in judicial decision-making during the two different periods.  Accordingly, I will focus on 
the mechanisms associated with expertise (general and specific deference) and the rally 
effect in the empirical section of this paper. 
 
Turning now from incentives to disincentives to accommodate Congress and the 
President.  The justices have at least two disincentives to defer.  The judicial desire to 
constrain the federal government in times of war rather than enable it is likely to emerge 
from the fact that many legal scholars—as well as the justices themselves—believe the 
Supreme Court represents the third branch of government, the independent branch, and 
one that the Framers designed to operate above the fray of politics.73  Through a system 
                                                
70 EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note at. 
71 [Cite Surveys, Political Science literature on war] 
72 Grossman. 
73  
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of life-tenure and financial security, the justices (unlike elected politicians) are able to 
reach rational and balanced decisions that work to protect minority members of the 
community from unfair policies that are so apt to emerge from majoritarian bodies.  
Many justices have suggested that they must take their “guarantor role” seriously and 
thus give legislative acts that implicate individual rights and interests heightened scrutiny.  
In fact, various justices have suggested that this role exists in all eras, but is particularly 
important in times of war when legislative policies become more extreme and possibly 
violative of individual interests in the name of the greater social good.74  
 
Not only do the justices have an incentive to constrain the federal government 
when dramatic new legislation emerges that harms minority interests (whether rights, 
liberties, or property interests), but failing to guard against this threat could be costly in 
terms of legitimacy.75  Put differently, even if the justices prefer to accommodate the 
government in times of crisis (because they agree with the law or due to the perceived 
inequalities in expertise), to do so could lead to the popular belief that the Court itself is 
simply a third majoritarian body and not an independent branch of government entitled to 
respect and deference.  This lack of legitimacy, in turn, could lead individuals, entities, 
and even government actors to ignore or even defy the Court’s rulings given that the 
Court is acting like a majoritarian body but was not elected in a democratic process.76  
Decisions that go against the government in times of war, therefore, can operate to 
cultivate the Court’s status as an independent branch of government, a status that the 
justices are likely to seek to protect and cultivate their unique position in our system of 
separated powers. 
 
These incentives to constrain are heightened in times of war and thus offer 
explanatory value for understanding differences in judicial decision-making, but they are 
unique to constitutional cases.  This is because the “guarantor role” emerges from the 
individual rights and liberties found in the Constitution and it is the Court that has the 
responsibility for determining when and if Congress has violated these rights and 
liberties.  If the litigant fails to raise a constitutional claim, then as noted above, the 
justices’ task is not to protect minority interests but to implement legislative preferences 
even they very much favor the majority over the individual.  Thus, while it is true that the 
legislators do pursue dramatic fiscal policy changes in wartime that may have harmful 
effects on individual property rights, without a constitutional question at hand, the 
justices’ will simply defer to the wording of the law and the intent of Congress.  
 
Table 3 summarizes the incentives and disincentives identified above and 
identifies when they are likely to emerge.  First, recall that the extant literature has 
considered judicial incentives only in the constitutional context, but note that these 
                                                
74  
75  
76 Scholars and commentators that subscribe to the containment have also noted that the Court not only acts 
as a protector of rights, but also as a “republican schoolmaster” that educates the public and its leaders 
about important aspects of rights and liberties and to dispose of this role in periods of national emergencies 
to undermine the Court’s role as an independent branch of government.  See, e.g., SILVERSTEIN, supra note 
at; Lerner, supra note at. 
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incentives differ quite a bit from those found in the statutory context.  Specifically, in the 
constitutional context, the Court has disincentives to accommodate the federal 
government but no such disincentives exist in the statutory context.  Second, notice that 
the desire to avoid sanctions exists in both peacetime and wartime, and thus offers no 
explanatory value for understanding the differences in judicial decision-making in 
wartime versus peacetime.  
 

















1) Support national security through complete 
deference to majoritarian bodies  
 
2) Support national security through limited 
deference to majoritarian bodies  
 
3) Avoid sanctions 
 
















































1) Cultivate status as independent body 
above the fray of politics 
 



























*Note:  Incentives that are identical in peacetime and wartime (which have a line drawn through them) cannot explain 
differences in observed outcomes in the different periods.  This study will focus on the possible explanations for 
observed differences in the statutory context.   
 
 In the statutory context, the only mechanisms that can lead the justices to issue 
more pro-government decisions in times of crisis are:  1) the desire to support national 
security through complete deference to the majoritarian branches of government, 2) the 
desire to support national security through limited deference to majoritarion bodies on 
issues specifically addressed by Congress and the President, and 3) the rally effect.  From 
Table 3 we can also conclude that these same mechanisms operate in the constitutional 
context, but the justices also have strong incentives to issue anti-government decisions.  
Thus we cannot predict the precise affect of war on judicial decision-making outside the 
context of statutory decision-making.  For this reason, and because the number of 
constitutional cases in the database are so few, I focus on statutory decision-making in 
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IV. The Effects of War on SUPREME COURT FISCAL DECISION-MAKING   
 
I now turn to an empirical investigation of the effects of war on judicial fiscal 
policy.  Recall Section II investigated the raw data and found evidence that war induced 
substantial changes in judicial behavior in the tax context.  Section III explored possible 
explanations for these differences and identified three possible mechanisms that could 
explain the observed judicial behavior.  I now re-examine the data to determine whether 
the findings identified in Section II are robust to various statistical controls.  I also seek to 
identify the best possible explanation for this change in behavior, if it continues to exist 
in the face of other possible explanatory factors.  Section IVA describes three simple 
models and outlines my predictions; Section IVB discusses my assumptions and the 
possible biases of my study; and Section IVC presents empirical results.  I find that the 
justices do exhibit pro-government preferences in times of war, and that the most likely 
explanation for the observed results is a desire to support national security through 
limited deference to the majoritarian bodies.  I do not find support for general deference 
or for the rally effect as explanations for judicial decision-making in crisis periods.  
Finally, the data indicate the desire to support a strong and uniform national policy 
through limited deference was strongest during the WWII era. 
 
A. Models and Predictions. 
 
For purposes of this paper, I focus on the statutory decisions in the database and 
set aside the Court’s opinions in the constitutional cases.  As noted above, I do this for 
several reasons.  First, the number of constitutional decisions in the database is few, just 
14% of all cases involved a constitutional claim (n=156).  Second, in every single war, 
except the Vietnam War, the U.S. government prevailed in 100% of the cases it litigated.  
This means that the dataset does not provide enough variation for purposes of statistical 
analysis.77  Third, the incentive structure outlined above does not offer the clear 
                                                
77 The trends in constitutional decision-making are summarized in Table 1A below.   
 
Table 1A:  Trends in Constitutional Tax Cases 
 
Government Prevails Wartime Peacetime 
Constitutional Cases Generally N=156 76% 86% 
WWI, N=1 100%  
WWII, N=11 100%  
Korean War N=2 100%  
Vietnam N=7 29%  
 
Although the Court primarily focuses on statutory controversies in both wartime and peacetime, it granted 
certiorari to and decided 156 cases raising constitutional questions between 1909 and 2005.  Only 21 of 
these cases, however, were decided during wartime and in every war, with the exception of the Vietnam 
War, the Court decided 100% of the cases in favor the government.  While the number of constitutional 
cases that reached the Supreme Court is very small, this change that occurred in the Vietnam era suggests 
an abrupt judicial change of viewpoint.  Although the types of cases that emerged on the Court’s docket did 
not notable change, the Court’s median ideology changes quite a bit by the Vietnam War era.  The Court’s 
average median ideology during the Vietnam was -.6884, which is quite a bit more liberal than the Courts 
that decided the constitutional cases in WWII, which had a score equal to  -.2748 and the Korean War, 
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predictions in constitutional cases as it does in statutory cases and thus it will be 
impossible to identify the specific mechanisms at work.  And finally, the extant literature 
has thoroughly investigated Supreme Court constitutional decision-making in times of 
war and I seek to extend this literature into the statutory context for purposes of 
understanding its generalizability. 
 
Judicial choices in the statutory context are likely to be grounded in several 
factors, but for purposes of this paper I am interested only in the effects of war.  Because 
my dependent variable is binary, I adopt a probit model, which provides the most 
advantages for analyzing this type of data.  Specifically, I seek to understand and explain 
whether war changes the probability that the government will prevail in wartime tax 




Pr(Yij =1) ="(# 0 + #1I(war =1) + #Xi)  
 
Where Y is Court decision in statutory case i that goes in favor of either the taxpayer or 
government during war j; war is an indicator variable for the existence of on-going major 
military activity; Χ  is a vector of independent variables that I will discuss further below.  
My coefficient of interest is on the war variable, ß1, and if the Court desires to promote 
national security in times of war through a generalized approach to deference, I expect 
that this coefficient will be positive and statistically significant.  That is to say, the 
existence of war will increase the probability that the U.S. government will prevail in tax 
cases generally.  
 
Recall from Section III, however, that there are two other possible mechanisms 
that can work as mechanisms producing an increased number of pro-government 
decisions in times of war.  If the justices desire to promote national security, but only on 
issues that Congress and the President specifically address, then we should not observe an 
overall pro-government bias in times of war but only a bias in cases that involve 
taxpayers and laws specifically addressed by Congress and the President.  As noted 
above, Congress acted swiftly and dramatically in WWI, WWII, and the Korean War to 
raise taxes to extreme levels.  During the Vietnam and Gulf Wars, tax rates increased but 
the reforms were minor and historians argue they were not directly related to war funding 
concerns.  In order examine the possibility of a weak form of deference rather than a 




Pr(Yij =1) ="(# 0 + #1I(WW =1) + # 2I(WWII =1) + # 3(Korea)
+# 4I(Vietnam =1) + # 5I(Gulf =1) + #Xi)
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
which had an average score of .3969.  Thus from the political changes alone, we might expect the Court to 
change its views.  Yet no study or theory suggests that liberal courts will favor taxpayers over the 
government—the theory suggests just the opposite. 
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Where Y is Court decision in statutory case i that goes in favor of either the taxpayer or 
government in war j; WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, and Gulf are all indicator variables 
for the named war; and Χ  is a vector of independent variables.  My coefficients of 
interest again are those attached to the war variables, ß1 through ß5.  If the justices have a 
general preference for uniform government policies in times of war, then all six of these 
coefficients will be positive and statistically significant.  If the justices adhere to weak 
form of deference then I expect on the coefficients on WWI, WWII, and the Korean War, 
ß1, ß2, and ß3, to be positive and statistically significant but the coefficients on the 
Vietnam and Gulf Wars, ß4 and ß5, to be = 0.  
 
To further investigate the possibility of a weak form of deference, I examine the 
corporate and taxpayers cases separately.  This will enable me to identify whether the 
justices treat these taxpayers differently depending on the wartime era under 
consideration.  Recall that Congress focused on corporations as the means to raise large 
amounts of revenue very quickly in WWI, but in WWII and the Korean War, legislators 
looked to individual taxpayers for purposes of raising revenue.  Given that we observe 
unique legislative changes in each wartime period, I expect that judicial choices will also 
reflect these congressional choices if the justices have adopted a weak form of deference.   
 
To investigate this possibility, I rerun the model immediately above first with 
only corporate taxpayers and then with only individual taxpayers.  My coefficients of 
interest continue to be those associated with the five wars, ß1 through ß5.  In WWI, when 
Congress quickly and significantly increased the tax obligations of corporations, the data 
and theory above lead me to predict that ß1 will be positive—indicating that the Court is 
more likely to side with the government in corporate cases than in individual cases.  In all 
other wars, I do not expect war to play a role as corporations were not the major source of 
revenue and thus I expect ß2, though ß5 = 0.  With respect to individual taxpayer cases, I 
expect the opposite.  That is, I expect the coefficient on WWI, ß1, will be negative as 
Congress did not rely on individuals in WWI, but ß2 and ß3 to be positive as Congress 
relied on individuals in WWII and the Korean War as a funding source. Finally, I expect 
the coefficients on the Vietnam and Gulf Wars, ß4 and ß5, to be = 0 as Congress did not 
heavily rely on taxpayers at all to fund the wars. 
 
Finally, I investigate the possibility that changes in judicial decision-making are 
entirely associated with the rally effect and not war at all.  For purposes of partialling out 
these effects, I fit the following model: 
 
! 
Pr(Yij =1) ="(# 0 + #1I(rally =1) + #Xi)  
 
Where Y is Court decision in statutory case i that goes in favor of either the taxpayer or 
government during war j; rally is a variable that controls for a spike in Presidential 
popularity rankings; Χ is a vector of independent variables.  My coefficient of interest is 
on the rally variable, ß1.  If the Court is affected by the pro-American feelings due to the 
perceived national threat but not by concerns associated with military expertise, we 
should observe this coefficient to be positive and statistically significant.  That is to say, 
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the existence of the rally and not war increases the probability that the U.S. government 
will prevail in tax cases generally.  
 
B. Assumptions and Possible Selection Biases 
 
 For purposes of understanding the assumptions that underlie this study and the 
possible biases that might emerge, it is useful to conceptualize the variable “war” as if it 
were a “treatment” on the Supreme Court justices.  Placed into this context, it is easy to 
see that this study seeks to measure the effects of treatment (i.e. war) on judicial tax 
decisions.  Just as countless medical studies seek to understand and explain whether a 
new drug—the treatment—affects the outcome of a patient, I seek to understand and 
explain whether war affects the outcome of tax cases in the Supreme Court.  As noted 
above, economists label this type of study a “natural experiment” because the treatment 
arose due to an exogenous event (in this context, Congress and the President made the 
decision to go to war).78  A natural experiment or quasi-experiment always has a control 
group, which is not affected by the policy change, and a treatment group, which we 
believe is affected by the policy change.  The behaviors or outcomes of the two groups 
are then compared for purposes of measuring the affects of the treatment on the 
population of interest.79  Because the U.S. engaged in five major wars over the course of 
the Twentieth Century, we can think of my study as a series of five natural experiments 
on the Court, each one correlating with a different war.    
 
To understand the assumptions underlying this study and possible hidden biases, 
consider the counterfactual framework that motivates any experiment.  Denote y1 as the 
outcome with treatment and y0 as the outcome without treatment.80  To measure the true 
effects of treatment, I would like to identify the average difference in the outcomes with 
and without treatment, y1 - y0 or, put differently, the quantity of interest is the average 
treatment effect which can be denoted:  ATE ≡ E(y1 - y0).81  ATE is the expected effect of 
treatment on a randomly drawn person from the population.  In my context, ATE would 
be the expected effect of war on a randomly drawn case between the period 1909 and 
2000.  The problem, of course, is that a case cannot be in both states (i.e. the exact same 
case cannot be litigated in both wartime and peacetime) and thus we cannot observe both 
y1 and y0.82  Empiricists label this difficulty the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference 
and have developed techniques to overcome the dilemma.83  One possibility is randomly 
to divide cases into a treatment group (the war cases) and a control group (the peacetime 
cases).  With randomization, there is no reason to believe that in the absence of treatment 
                                                
78  
79  




83 See JUDEA PEARL, CAUSALITY:  MODELS, REASONING, AND INFERENCE (2000); Donald Rubin, 
Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized and NonRandomized Studies, 66 J. ED. PSYCH. 689 
(1974); Paul Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASSOC. 946 (1986). 
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the two groups would be, on average, different from one another.  Thus the outcome of 
the control group would provide a valid “counterfactual” for the treatment group.    
 
The central feature of a classic randomized experiment—the existence of a 
control group to estimate what would have happened in the absence of the treatment—
lies behind the idea of a natural experiment, which is what this study relies upon to 
identify the effects of war.  In the natural experiment, the researcher must make use of the 
differences in outcomes between the treatment group and a control group, just as in a 
classic experiment, but the treatment status emerged through nature or, in this study, 
through the decision-making process of Congress and the President.84  The fact that the 
treatment status in this study was not determined by a randomized procedure, however, 
raises the possibility that any comparisons between the two groups of cases will be 
biased.  In order to determine the credibility of the natural experiment—to assure 
unbiased results—it is important to examine the characteristics of the cases that were 
placed into the control and treatment groups due to the foreign policy crisis that emerged. 
Valid causal inference requires that the treatment and control groups be identical on all 
relevant factors.85  If the two groups differ, then it is possible that the observed 
differences in judicial outcomes has nothing to do with the war and everything to do with 
the type of case litigated in Court or the judicial make-up of the Court.86  
 
For these purposes, recall the summary statistics presented in Table 1 comparing 
the two groups of cases.  Table 1 indicates that the control and treatment groups (that is, 
the peacetime and wartime cases, respectively) are nearly identical on ten of the thirteen 
factors observed.  Thus as noted above, the cases in both periods have similar types of 
claims, parties, interpretive approaches, reasons for granting certiorari, case complexity, 
media coverage and so forth.  These statistics offer some evidence for the credibility of 
this natural experiment for assessing the effects of war.   
 
The one observable difference between the wartime and peacetime cases that 
could confound the result of this study is the ideology of the Court.  Table 1 indicates that 
the justices are liberal in both eras, but are quite a bit more liberal in times of war.87  This 
fact poses a problem for this study as many scholars have theorized that liberal justices 
are more likely to side with the government than the taxpayer in tax cases.  Numerous 
empirical studies investigating this theory exist, but only one study found a correlation 
between judicial ideology and tax outcomes—and the finding is limited to cases 
involving corporate entities.88  Thus if we find that wartime Courts produce an increased 
number of pro-government decisions in the corporate context, this finding may not be due 
to the incentive structure discussed above but to the ideology of the Court.  Because no 
scholar has ever identified a correlation between judicial ideology and pro-government 
                                                
84 DAVID CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT:  THE NEW ECONOMICS OF THE 
MINIMUM WAGE 20-28 (1995) 
85  
86  
87 See supra notes and accompanying text. 
88 SEE Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein, & Peter Weidenbeck, The Ideological Component of Taxation, WASH. U. 
L. REV. (2007) 
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outcomes in individual taxpayer cases, notwithstanding a number of attempts, ideology 
should is not a worrisome confounding factor outside the corporate context.  For this 
reason, and various other reasons discussed above associated with the type of legal 
reform Congress adopted, I examine the cases in the aggregate and then separately based 
on whether the taxpayer is a corporation or individual. 
   
There is one final—and unobservable—feature of the two groups of cases that 
may also confound the empirical results.  The data presented in Table 1 does not provide 
a comparison of the cases based on the taxpayers’ probability of prevailing.  This is an 
important dimension because if the taxpayers litigate a larger number of cases in which 
they are likely to lose in wartime relative to peacetime, cases in which the law 
unambiguously goes in favor of the government, then the justices will decide a greater 
percentage of the cases in favor of the government even if their choice calculus has not 
changed at all.   In short, if the dataset suffers from this selection problem (i.e. difference 
selection of cases exist in wartime than peacetime), then we may observe a positive “war 
effect” and attribute this effect to judicial behavioral changes when in fact the outcomes 
have everything to do with the taxpayers and nothing to do with the justices themselves.   
 
Why would the taxpayers litigate easy cases in times of war versus peacetime?  
One explanation has to do with the law itself:  As Congress raises tax rates and imposes 
increased burdens on taxpayers—taxpayers are likely to bring more and more challenges 
to the law.  After all, even if the probability of prevailing is quite low, if the stakes are 
high, then taxpayers will have an increased incentive to challenge the IRS in federal 
court.89   
 
The data, however, suggest taxpayers have not adopted this strategy.  First, the 
Court granted certiorari to nearly all the cases decided during wartime prior to the time 
that military actions began and prior to the time that Congress adopted the legal reforms 
that are likely to change the taxpayers’ calculus for deciding whether or not to litigate.  
The time period from the initial filing in lower federal court to the certiorari decision is 
roughly seven years for the cases in the database, and thus taxpayers subjected to heavy 
wartime taxes cannot expect to get a hearing until well after the wartime endeavors have 
ceased.  In fact, the only war that lasted long enough to allow early legislation to reach 
the Supreme Court before the end of the war is the Vietnam War—but Congress did not 
adopt any wartime legislation until 1969 only five years before the war’s conclusion.90  
Second, the data presented in Table 1 indicate that that the percentage of cases considered 
by the Supreme Court in which the taxpayer prevailed in the lower courts is nearly 
identical in peacetime and wartime, 53% and 55% respectively.91  These percentages 
suggest that the justices were not granting a disproportionate number of easy cases in 
                                                
89 Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493-501 
(1996). 
90 If taxpayers are litigating cases that are easier for the government to win but these cases are not decided 
until after the war, then the effect will be to bias the estimate of the war effects downward to 0.  That is to 
say, these cases, if they exist, will lead to many more pro-government outcomes in times of peace and thus 
the comparison between peacetime and wartime decision-making will be curbed.  
91 See supra notes and accompanying text. 
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wartime, if they were, the proportion of cases in which the taxpayer won should notably 
decrease in wartime.  From this data, we can conclude that the study does not suffer from 
a selection effect with respect to the type of taxpayers that come into Court in different 
eras. 
 
In sum, the evidence suggests that I have a credible natural experiment with one 
possible confounding factor:  ideology in cases involving corporate taxpayer cases.  It 
may be impossible to separate the effects of war from ideology in this context and thus I 
pay special attention to this problem when presenting my findings. 
 
C. Empirical Results.  
 
I now present the empirical results from the models above.  My variable of 
interest is war and its coefficient measures the change in the probability of pro-
government decision in wartime versus peacetime.  I estimate my models first with war 
generally, then with war disaggregated into the five major wars in the database, namely 
WWI, WWII, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War.  I then examine just 
how robust the simple models are to models that include a number of covariates that 
might also have explanatory value for explaining judicial decision-making.  Because my 
dependent variable in each model is the case outcome and this is a binary variable coded 
= 1 if the government wins and coded = 0 if the taxpayer wins, I adopt a probit model.93  
The raw coefficients in probit models, unlike OLS models, are difficult to interpret and 
thus I do not present the raw coefficients but rather I present coefficients that identify the 
actual change in the predicted probability of a pro-government.  This means that the 
coefficients presented in each of the tables below are directly interpretable in the same 
manner as an OLS model.  Put even more directly, the coefficients indicate the 
percentage point change in the probability of a pro-government decision with a unit 
increase in the independent variable; the coefficient on war, therefore, identifies the 
percentage increase in the likelihood of a pro-government decision during wartime versus 
peacetime.94  The variables that achieve statistical significance, an indication that we can 
have confidence in the estimates, are marked with *** if we can trust the coefficient with 
99% confidence and with ** if we can trust the coefficient with 95% confidence. 
 
Table 4 presents four different models assessing the effects of war on judicial 
decision-making.  The first model examines case outcomes only as a function of war and 
indicates that the existence of war increases the probability that the government will 
prevail in tax cases by 7 percentage points.  The average government win rate in the 
model is 69%, and from Table 5 we can now conclude that this probability increases to 
                                                
93 For a discussion of models for binary dependent variables, see J. SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR 
CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPENDENT VARIABLES (1997). 
94 Specifically, the coefficients can be interpreted in the following way:  For a one unit increase in the 
independent variable, the predicted probability of a pro-government decision increases (decreases) by the 
percentage points indicated by the coefficient.  See LONG, supra note  at 75.  Or more formally, ΔPr(y=1|x) 
/ Δxk  = Pr(y=1|x, xk + δ) - Pr(y=1|x, xk).  See id. 
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76% during wartime.  Model 2 disaggregates the wartime periods and suggests that war 
has not affected the Supreme Court in every era in the identical way; instead, this model 
indicates that WWII is driving all the results presented in Column 1.  The government’s 
likelihood of winning in WWII was 9 percentage points higher than in peacetime and this 
finding is statistically significant.  The coefficient on WWI is negative, indicating the 
government is less likely to prevail in this era but this finding is not statistically 
significant.  The coefficient on the Vietnam and Gulf wars are positive but also not 
statistically significant indicating that we cannot be confident war has any impact 
whatsoever on the Supreme Court during these time periods.  Notably, these results do 
not change depending on whether I include or exclude the corporate taxpayers.  This 
suggests that ideology is not confounding the results—a concern discussed above. 
 
Models 3 and 4 refit the data adding six covariates to test the robustness of the 
results in presented in the first two models.  Adding controls for the existence of an 
economic crisis, the party litigating the case, the Court’s interpretive method, and the 
complexity of the case does not have any effect on the results presented in the simple 
models.  I still find a statistically significant result for war in the aggregate as well as for 
WWII in model 4.  
 


















*  Note:  Dependent variable is case outcome coded =1 if the government prevails and coded=0 if the taxpayer prevails.  
All the independent variables are binary; the models present robust standard errors.  Variables marked with *** 
indicates statistical significance at p ≤ .01 level and ** at the p ≤ .05. 
 
In order to determine whether the results presented in Table 4 are due to a general 
or weak form of deference, I re-examine the models separately for individual and 
corporate taxpayers.  To do this, I take the same approach as in Table 4:  I first examine 
simple models and then move to progressively more complex models that control for 
various factors that might confound the results.  Table 5 presents the empirical findings 
for the corporate taxpayers and Table 6 presents results for individual taxpayers.   
Probit Models With Marginal Effects 
 








War .07(.033)**  .08(.03)**  
World War I  -.06(.11)  -.10(.12)  
World War II  .09(.03)**  .089(.04)**  
Korean War  .03(.09)  .038(.09)  
Vietnam War  .07(.06)  .10(.06) 
Economic Crisis   .08(.03)** .079(.03)***  
Corporate Taxpayer   -.05(.03) -.054(.03) 
Individual Taxpayer   -.01(.04) -.003(.04) 
Textualist Method   .01(.03) .009(.03) 
Substantive method   -.05(.03)* -.06(.028) 
Complex Case   .12(.05)** .134(.05)** 
Observations 943 943 942 942 
Pseudo R2 .005 .008 .01 .02 
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Beginning first with the corporate taxpayer cases.  The data present surprising 
results—there is no war affect either in the aggregate or with respect to individual 
wartime periods.  These results hold in the both the simple models (models 1 and 2) and 
the more complex models (models 3 and 4).  In fact, the only factors that impact the 
government’s probability of prevailing in the tax cases are national economic crises and 
the complexity of the case—when these two variables are both present the U.S. 
government’s probability of winning is close to 100%!  The fact that war does not have 
any explanatory value in corporate taxpayer cases—even controlling for Court 
ideology—suggests something important about the mechanisms for wartime judicial 
behavior.  If the incentive associated with creating national security through general 
deference to the U.S. government accurately described the Court, then we should have 
observed a positive and statistically significant coefficient on war in every one of these 
models, a finding we do not have.   
 
Because the findings on not statistically significant we have proof that the Court 
does not adopt a position of generalized deference; we have now eliminated one possible 
explanation for the observed data.  But do the results suggest selective deference?  The 
only period in which Congress looked to corporate taxpayers to fund the wartime 
activities was in WWI and thus we should have observed a positive coefficient on 
WWI—and model 2 in Table 5 indicates as much.  The coefficient indicates that during 
WWI, the government was 13 percentage points more likely to prevail than in 
peacetime—a large substantive effect.  This finding as just noted, however, is not 
statistically significant and thus we cannot be confident of the results.  Unfortunately, this 
lack of statistical significance may be due to the fact that WWI involved only 10 
corporate cases and thus statistical power is very is limited.  If we look back to the raw 
data presented above in Table 2, we can see that the government won 80% of the 
controversies and this provides limited evidence that selective deference is the best 
explanation for the observed judicial outcomes in times of war.  Finally, it is valuable to 
note, that if the justices indeed adopted a weak form of deference, then we should not 
observe any effect in WWII, and the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf War and the models in 
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*  Note:  Dependent variable is case outcome coded =1 if the government prevails and coded=0 if the taxpayer prevails.  
All the independent variables are binary; the models present robust standard errors.  Variables marked with *** 
indicates statistical significance at p ≤ .01 level and ** at the p ≤ .05. 
  
Table 6 presents the empirical findings with respect to individual taxpayers.  
Regardless of how the models are specified, war has an impact on WWI and WWII cases, 
but not in the later wartime periods.  Notably the findings go in different directions in 
each of these two wars:  In WWI, the government is 37% less likely to win an individual 
tax case and in WWII, the government is 23% more like to win an case involving an 
individual taxpayer.  Given that Congress did not rely on individual taxpayers in WWI 
but relied heavily on this group in WWII for purposes of funding the wars, we view 
Table 6, along with Table 5, as confirming the idea that the Court adopts a specific form 
of deference.  We do not observe generalized deference to all cases, but only to cases that 






                                                
95 These results also hold when I examine each war separately and compare the government win-rates in 
individual versus corporate taxpayer cases.  Table 2A presents the results of these regressions and confirm 
the findings in the text. 
Table 5A:  Corporate versus Individual Taxpayers 
 
Probit Models with Marginal Effects 
Independent Variable World War I 
n=14 






Corporate Taxpayer .52**(.260) -.19**(.07) .11(.44) .001(.14) 
Textualist Method -.20(.24) -.08(.081) .5(.22) .039(.15) 
Substantive Method  -.10(.079) -.56(.30) .07(.17) 
Court Politics  -.15(.11) -.29(.25) -.22(.19) 
R2 .265 .096 .203 .039 
 
Probit Models With Marginal Effects 
 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
War .08(.05)  -.04(.08)  
World War I  .13(.14)   
World War II  .007(.06)  -.09(.08) 
Korean War  -.30(.27)  -.15(.31) 
Vietnam War  .12(.10)  .04(.13) 
Economic Crisis   -.11(.26) .08(.075)** 
Textualist Method   .05(.06) .06(.06) 
Substantive method   -.04(.07) -.03(.07) 
Complex Case   .41(.17)** .43(.17)*** 
Court Politics   -.15(.11) -.18(.12) 
Observations 383 383 201 201 
Pseudo R2 .002 .01 .04 .05 
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*  Note:  Dependent variable is case outcome coded =1 if the government prevails and coded=0 if the taxpayer prevails.  
All the independent variables are binary; the models present robust standard errors.  Variables marked with *** 
indicates statistical significance at p ≤ .01 level and ** at the p ≤ .05. 
 
Together Tables 4, 5, and 6 offer a preliminary explanation for the increased 
number of pro-government decisions in times of war.  As discussed above, if the justices 
believe they lack the expertise to make informed choices about wartime strategy, and 
perhaps even fear that they could undermine national success through unintentional 
interferences, they are likely to defer to Congress and the President in times of war.  The 
empirical data suggest the justices do seek to accommodate the elected branches of 
government but not in every case that shows up on the docket, only in cases that address 
issues that Congress and the President have expressly addressed.  For this reason, the 
findings suggest the Court seeks to support national security through limited deference to 
the majoritarian bodies. 
 
There is one final mechanism—the rally effect—that must also be investigated 
before we reach a conclusion as to the mechanism that best explains judicial decision-
making times of war.  As noted above, many surveys find that when the nation is under 
siege from a perceived international threat, citizen rally around the flag and offer 
increased support for the President.  The rally effect tends to lead to a generalized support 
for executive decision-making and enables the adoption of policies that may not be 
possible in peacetime.  If the justices, like Americans generally, experience these 
nationalistic feelings then they may be more sympathetic to the government’s legal 
positions in the tax cases on the docket irrespective of the issues involved.   
 
Survey data indicates that Americans rallied around the flag in 1941, 1950, 1967, 
and 1969, years in which the Court decided a total of 55 tax cases.  The question I seek to 
answer is whether the likelihood of a pro-government decision is greater during these 
rally periods than during the non-rally periods.  Thus for purpose of this part of the study, 
rallies are the treatment variable of interest.  Table 7 presents a model that tests for a 
Probit Model With Marginal Effects 
 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
War .14(.05)**  .09(.07)   
World War I  -.37(.18)*  -.37(.18)**  
World War II  .23(.07)***  .23(.05)*** .16(.07)** 
Korean War  .02(.13)  -.05(.14) .04(.12) 
Vietnam War  .11(.10)  .11(.10) -.02(.12) 
Economic Crisis   .004(.17) -.19(.10) -.10(.22) 
Textualist Method   .02(.06) -.09(.06) .02(.06) 
Substantive method   .05(.06) -.06(.05) .05(.06) 
Complex Case   -.04(.07)  -.03(.09) -.07(.07) 
Court Politics   -.15(.08)*  -.13(.09) 
Observations 287 286 184 286 183 
Pseudo R2 .01 .05 .01 .07 .04 
 Draft March 21, 2008 




correlation between rally effects and judicial decision-making and finds a negative effect.  
This means that the justices are less likely to exhibit a pro-government bias during 
periods when the nation-at-large is feeling strong nationalistic feelings due to perceived 
foreign threats.  Because most of the cases were decided during the WWII rally (n=30), I 
examined this rally separately and found an even stronger negative effect.  Adding the 
same control variables from above does not change this result.  It is important to note, 
however, that the rally findings are no statistically significant; in fact, the confidence 
intervals indicate that rallies may not affect the justices at all or the effect may be quite a 
bit more negative than indicated in Table 7.  None of the findings suggest that we should 
expect a positive coefficient on the rally variable and thus the best estimate we have is 
that the rallies have either no affect or a negative effect. 
 
















*  Note:  Dependent variable is case outcome coded =1 if the government prevails and coded=0 if the taxpayer prevails.  
All the independent variables are binary; the models present robust standard errors.  Variables marked with *** 
indicates statistical significance at p ≤ .01 level and ** at the p ≤ .05. 
 
The fact that Table 7 rules out the possibility that rallies increase the probability 
that the Court will issues a pro-government decision indicates that the conclusions from 
above are very robust.  That is to say, the raw data along with the thirteen statistical 
models depicted above suggest that the Court is willing to defer to the elected branches of 
government during times of war.  This deference, however, is not grounded on irrational 
exuberance associated with the rally effect nor is it unbounded in the sense that the Court 
will defer on all issues that emerge on the docket.  Rather the deference is restrained and 
limited as evidenced by the fact that it only emerges in cases that raise similar issues to 
those directly addressed by Congress and the President.  For this reason, we observe an 
increase in the number of pro-government decisions in WWI in corporate cases (but not 
individual cases); in WWII in individual cases (but not corporate cases) and no affects in 
the later wars when the politicians sent conflicting signals on the importance of 







Probit Models With Marginal Effects 
 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rally -.09 
(.07) 
 -01 (.07)  
World War II Rally  -.14 (.10)  -.16(.10) 
Economic Crisis   .04(.66) .01(.07) 
Textualist Method   .01 (.04) .02 (.04) 
Substantive method   -.008 (.04) -.04 (.04) 
Complex Case   .11 (.08) .10 (.06) 
Observations 421 421 421 421 
Pseudo R2 .003 .004 .004 .01 
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This paper seeks to identify and explain the effects of major wars on U.S. 
Supreme Court decision-making in the context of taxation.  At first cut, it may not seem 
obvious why we should expect to observe a correlation between military activities and 
judicial fiscal policy.  After all, the justices have no authority whatsoever to engage in 
military planning or to adopt laws that relieve the budgetary pressures that tend to emerge 
in times crisis.  The Court, however, is able to contribute to the revenue-raising efforts 
indirectly by adopting a pro-government attitude in wartime periods.  As the probability 
of a government win increases, for example, the expected revenue to the federal fisc also 
increases.   
 
Various scholars have investigated this question in the context of constitutional 
rights and liberties have reached mixed and often conflicting results.  One explanation for 
the assorted findings in the extant literature is related to the fact that judicial incentive are 
themselves contradictory in the rights and liberties context and thus it is not only 
impossible to predict ex ante how wars will affect the justices, but the results themselves 
are likely to be sensitive to the specific cases analyzed.  In the fiscal context, by contrast, 
there are various judicial incentives at work but all operate in the same direction—and all 
in favor the government.  For this reason, I am able to identify whether war induces the 
Court to change its behavior as well as why the observed changes occur. 
 
Relying on Supreme Court tax decisions issued between the years 1909-2000, this 
paper identifies a strong positive correlation between major wartime activity and the 
probability that the government will prevail.  This pro-government bias appears to 
operate through the judicial belief that Congress and the President are better suited to 
address national emergencies.  This perceived imbalance of expertise, however, does not 
lead the Court to adopt a strategy of total deference, but rather a restricted form that 
involves accommodation only on issues that Congress and the President have signaled are 
important to the on-going war activities.  These findings are robust and rule out the 
possibility that the Court is motivated by short-term irrational exuberance for federal 
policymakers associated with the so-called “rally-effect” that emerges when Americans 
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DATA CODING APPENDIX 
 
Data Collection and Coding Procedures 
 
1. The 1,113 tax cases were obtained through the Westlaw search identified in 
the text at footnote 30. 
 
2. War is a binary variable = 1 if the military activities involved nuclear 
capabilities or the mobilization of multiple aircraft carrier task groups, 
battalions, or combat wings and =0 otherwise.96   
 
The start date of a major war was identified by the earliest of the following:  
the declaration of war, the deployment of troops, or a Presidential request for 
escalated war powers.  The end date of the war was as the date upon which the 
U.S. President officially declared the war to be over, through a treaty, public 
statement, or so forth.  Specifically, 
  
a. WWI:  4/6/1917 through 6/28/1919 
b. WWII:  12/7/1941 through 8/14/1945 
c. Korean War:  6/27/1950 through 7/27/1953 
d. Vietnam War:  2/7/1965 through 1/27/1973 
e. Gulf War:  1/16/1991 through 4/11/1991 
 
3. Economic Crisis is a binary variable =1 if a major economic crisis existed and 
= 0 otherwise.  A major economic crisis is defined as a decline in the 
country’s GDP for 4 or more successive quarters and at least once by five or 
more percentage points in that period.  There is no widely accepted definitions 
of a major economic crisis; a recession is defined a period when the GDP 
decreases in two or more successive quarters.  My definition picks up the 
years from 1929-1932 and 1945-1946.   
 
4. Corporate Taxpayer is a binary variable =1 if the party litigating the case is a 
corporate entity and 0 otherwise.  A corporate entity is a business firm whose 
articles of incorporation have been approved by some state; this excludes S-
Corporations and various other pass-through entities 
 
5. Individual Taxpayer is a binary variable =1 the party litigating the case is an 
individual and = 0.  Individuals do not include S-Corps, Pass-through entities, 
or estates. 
 
                                                
96 This is the commonly-used definition the law and political science literatures.  See, e.g., William Howell 
& Jon C. Pevehouse, President, Congress, and the Use of Force, 59 INTERNAT’L ORG. 209, 217 (2005). 
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6. Textualist Method is a binary variable =1 if the Court adopted a method of 
statutory interpretation that relied implicitly or explicitly on the text of the 
statute or on textual cannons of interpretation and = 0. 
 
7. Substantive Method is a binary variable =1 if the Court looked to substantive 
rationales for interpreting the statute that were unrelated to text of 
congressional intent and = 0.  Substantive rationales include general concerns 
for the economy, fairness, revenue-raising, and so-forth 
 
8. Complex Case is a binary variable =1 if the Court addressed more than one 
issue and = 0. 
 
9. Court Ideology is a continuous variable equal to the “Martin-Quinn” score.  
There are a variety of measures that one might use, but for purposes of this 
study I rely on the “Martin-Quinn” scores because they are available for the 
most Supreme Court Terms (from 1937-2005—no judicial ideology scores are 
yet available going back to 1909, the start date of this study).  The Martin-
Quinn scores are grounded in a special model of voting which assumes the 
Justices have choices over alternatives.  A negative score indicates a relatively 
liberal viewpoint, a score equal to 0 indicates moderate views, and a positive 
score indicates a relatively conservative viewpoint.97  Theoretically, the score 
are unbounded, but empirically the most liberal score in the database is XX 
and the most conservative score is XX.  I relied on the scores of the median 
justice for each term, which ranges from -.9317 and .6243, which are very 
moderate and typical of what we would expect of a median justice.   
 
 






                                                
97 See Andrew Martin & Kevin Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for 
the U.S Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10  POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002); see also Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. 
Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 
(1989) (providing an alternative measure of identifying judicial ideology). 
